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Abstract
Background: A recent paper presents an argument and mechanism for the possible stopping of
clinical trials early based on opportunity costs.
Discussion: Although we agree that the costs and opportunity costs of clinical trials need to be
reduced wherever possible, we raise concerns about the motivation and mechanism for stopping
clinical trials early raised by Lavery et al.
Summary: We argue that there are already enough acceptable criteria and actors in the clinical
trials arena to justify early stoppage of clinical trials, and argue that factors other than efficacy need
to be carefully considered, especially in developing country contexts.
Background
In response to recent arguments for a mechanism to stop
certain clinical trials early based on 'opportunity costs',
Lavery et al. [1] develop some arguments and a mecha-
nism for doing so, so that the resources saved can be redi-
rected to more promising products. In the same paper,
Buchanan raises some critical concerns about these pro-
posals.
Discussion
Although we agree with many of the points, particularly
the reduction of opportunity costs in clinical trials, raised
by Lavery et al. [1], we are largely more persuaded by
Buchanan's views, to which we wish to add two more dis-
cussion points.
Firstly, as an IRB chair and microbicide trials PI respec-
tively from a developing country setting, we have con-
cerns about the introduction of yet another player, the
proposed Scientific Oversight Committee (SOC) into the
already complex clinical trials oversight arena. At present
clinical trials are subject to oversight and amendment by
sponsors, IRBs, regulatory authorities, host institutions,
government health departments, DSMBs and various lay-
ers of community input and participation. While essential
to the ethical and scientific conduct of a clinical trial,
engagement and compliance with these parties has vari-
ous financial, personnel and efficiency costs. Introduction
of yet another player will only further increase this
'administrative drag'. The costs of this additional layer
need to be factored against any proposed advantages.
A completed Phase III randomised clinical trial can yield
unequivocal efficacy data. Clinical trials with negative
outcomes yield important scientific information. The Col
1492 study data on a failed microbicide [2,3] has yielded
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unequivocal data, making it clear that that particular
product line is not worth further investment and risk.
However, the scale of the HIV pandemic in Africa warrants
the development of products that might have partial effi-
cacy that will nevertheless have significant public health
impact. For example, condoms are known to be highly
efficacious in preventing HIV transmission, but for social
and cultural reasons their uptake in the real world remains
low [4,5], having only a minor impact on reducing trans-
mission of HIV. In contrast, a potential product with
lower efficacy but higher community uptake and accepta-
bility could have a larger public health impact on reduc-
ing HIV transmission. Our point is that the HIV
prevention field at present would benefit from a spectrum
of interventions, all of which require completed Phase III
data to support their use, even if efficacy is lower than that
expected of newer products in the design pipeline. Prod-
uct effectiveness is not narrowly tied to efficacy, as is well
known. A less efficacious product may have the greatest
public health benefits, as the relative failure of condoms and
VCT have shown [4,6,7]. The prevention field needs mul-
tiple interventions. These will vary in efficacy but maxim-
ise effectiveness.
Our second point is that clinical trials conducted in devel-
oping country settings involve significant investments in
scientific and community capacity building. A narrow
focus on the product itself, or its opportunity costs, over-
looks the impact of stopping a clinical trial early (for other
than efficacy, safety or futility reasons) on the morale and
development of the participating scientists and related
personnel, and on the host community. Furthermore, we
cannot switch products without scientific data. Prior to
commencement of the trial, participants and participating
communities are informed of preclinical evidence of a
particular product and the reasons why the product
should undergo large scale human testing. If the product
is then deemed less promising based on a newer product,
the community will be justified in asking why the research
was commenced in the first place if the scientist did not
feel confident about its potential efficacy. In addition,
what scientific justification will be used to argue that the
newer product is going to be more efficacious? Pre-clinical
data or early safety testing? Even if the community is fore-
warned on the possible switch, it does not negate enor-
mous concern about the likely distrust the process may
create. There is likely to be a temporal gap in switching
products as it will involve new protocol, new approvals,
training of staff (if we are able to retain the team) and re-
educating the community.
Clinical trials are rightly increasingly expected by develop-
ing country IRBs and international ethics guidance to have
a community engagement [8] and capacity building
agenda [9,10]. The abrupt stoppage of a trial by a SOC
because a more promising product is on the horizon does
not take into account the emotional and moral commit-
ment of communities to a particular study process. It is a
difficult enough process to engage with participating com-
munities when studies are stopped for safety or futility
reasons, as the recent HIV vaccine STEP and Phambili
study stoppages have shown [11,12]. The first author, as
an IRB chair, has already had to intervene on behalf of an
investigator whose sponsors were considering discontinu-
ing his study, in its existing design, based on data from
other studies which had shown some efficacy. These refer-
ence studies, however, were related but not identical with
regard to the intervention itself, the controls, or, impor-
tantly, socio-cultural context. In this case not even DSMB
analyses were referenced. These grounds were disputed by
the trial team. It seemed clear that the sponsor wanted to
divert funds to an apparently more promising new prod-
uct - i.e., because of perceived opportunity costs. No con-
sideration was apparently given to the developmental
investment by the host institution, the scientific and tech-
nical staff, or the participating community. The study was
eventually allowed to continue.
We are concerned that the abrupt withdrawal of studies by
a proposed SOC will erode community engagement in
clinical trials in general, even if the role and potential
impact of SOC decisions are added to the (already com-
plex) enrolment and consent process. The loss of commu-
nity support and confidence in clinical trials can
constitute an opportunity cost not considered by Lavery et
al. or Buchanan. It is interesting to note that the decision
tree proposed by Lavery et al. bypasses IRBs, whose pri-
mary purpose it is to protect the welfare and dignity of
participating individuals and communities. IRBs are
merely to be 'advised' of study terminations by the SOC.
While the HIV prevention field needs innovation, and
effective new products are sorely needed, we argue that
current mechanisms are the only ones that should be used
to determine whether a clinical trial should be stopped
early. Due consideration should also be given to develop-
ment agendas and the obligations of the study site to the
participating communities whose engagement and invest-
ment reflect more than efficacy concerns. The costs of a
cold-blooded SOC decision to stop a trial will indeed be
"measured in the lives of the poor" [1].
We do, however, agree that investment in clinical trial site
development needs to be sensitive to opportunity and
other costs, and that trial sites should consider resource
sharing to accommodate initiatives and activities that can
make more efficient use of scarce resources, especially in
developing country settings. This can and should be done
without the oversight of an SOC. For example, many ini-
tiatives and centres in Africa are disease-specific, and
increased consideration should be given to breaking these
expensive and confining 'silos' and expanding the spec-BMC Medical Ethics 2009, 10:16 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6939/10/16
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trum of diseases targeted by such resource-intensive
research centres [13].
Premature stoppage of a trial for other than efficacy, safety
or futility reasons seems to us not to be a viable option.
The introduction of a SOC and implementation of its
decisions may have major opportunity costs of its own.
Furthermore, the role of a SOC would be more suited at
the product selection process and not after the trial has
been implemented. Rather, sites with clinical trial capacity
should endeavour to share resources (skills, laboratory
capacity, community engagement efforts) to reduce the
opportunity costs of a single trial with a long-term devel-
opmental agenda in mind. We argue that this can and
should be done without the intrusion of an SOC or
expanded DSMB.
Summary
We argue that clinical trials, especially in the HIV preven-
tion field, should only be stopped early on safety or futil-
ity grounds, and that developing country trial site capacity
and community trust in trials could be eroded by stop-
page on other grounds and mechanisms. We further argue
that the HIV prevention field will probably require many
products of varying efficacy until such time as an effective
preventive technology is in place.
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